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The overall purpose of this study is to present
appropriate comparative data on major DuD contractors and to
evaluate their profitability during the period 1980-1984. The
study is structured to examine two principal research
questions as they apply to a sample of 49 prime DUD
contractors. The first examines profitability from the macro
level, i.e. the defense industry taken as a whole. The second
involves an analysis of several defense contractors at the
micro level, i.e. individual firms and specific business
segments. The study includes a discussion ot the defense
perspective of the 198C's, an historical summary of DUD
defense policy, a review ot profit studies, and a summary of
selected financial data. The study's main conclusions are
that on the Dasis of the pror i taDi 1 i ty measures selected one
for the period 1^80-1984, DUD prime contractors were (i) more
profitable than their like—sized commercial oriented
competitors and {2) on both an aggregate and segment basis,
less exposeC to risk.
table of contents
I. INTRODUCTION o
A. DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE OF THE 198U's II
B. THE. DOD PIE 13
C. PROBLEMS IN STUDYING PROFIT 15
D. HISTORICAL SURVEY OF PROFIT STUDIES 19
II . THE DATA 27
III. THE SAMPLES/DEFINING THE BUSINESS POPULATION 31
A. SELECTION JF SAMPLES 31
B. ORIENTATION 2>2
IV. PROFITABILITY UF DUD CONTRACTORS-THE MACRO V LEri 38
A. GENERAL jo
B. i'HE PROt ITABILITY DIMENSION l^c^-1^84 Jb
C. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 4j
D. REGRESSION ANAL/SIS 4b
E. RISKS VS RETURNS 4b
F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS b'Z
V. PROFITABILITY OF DOD CONTRACTORS—THE MICRO VIEW bb
A. GENERAL bb
B. THE SEGMENTS 35
C. IhE PROFITABILITY MEASURE bb
D. INTERCOMPANY COMPARISONS 51
E. IN'i KAC JMPANY COMPARISONS 5s
F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 57
ANNEX: o^GMLNi DATA SricEib 5b
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 3b
4
APPENDIX A 193U SELECTED CORPORATE FINANCIAL DATA Sb
APPENDIX 6 1981 SELECTED CORPORATE FINANCIAL DATA 35
APPENDIX C 1932 SELECTED CORPORATE FINANCIAL, DATA 67
APPENDIX D 1983 SELECTED CORPORATE FINANCIAL DATA 83
APPENDIX E 1984 SELECTED CORPORATE FINANCIAL DATA 89
APPENDIX F 1980-1984 SEGMENT OPERATING MARGINS DATA 9U
LIST OF Rtlk ERENCES 91
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 9
J
LIST OF TAELES
1. DEFENSE SPENDING IN PERSPECTIVE: 1980-1984 12
2. SAMPLE OF 49 DOD PRIME CONTRACTORS J^
3. SAMPLE OF 36 COMMERCIALLY ORIENTED DOD
PRIME CONTRACTORS J 7
4. SAMPLE OF 13 DOD ORIENTED PRIME CONTRACTORS 37
5. SUMMARY NI/NVy DATA FOR SAMPLE GROUPS 39
6. SELECTED REGRESSION DATA: PCTDOD VS. NI/NW 4b
7. SELECTED NI/NW DATA FOR SAMPLE GROUPS 56
8. SAMPLE OF 11 DOD PRIME CONTRACTORS 55
S. POOLED OPERATING MARGINS-ANNUAL MEANS 52
1U. SEGMENT OPERATING MARGINS-5 YEAR MEANS G5
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Defense Contracts and the National Budget 14
2. Commercial vs. DOD Orientation j4
3. Profitability of the Fortune "250" and
49 DOD Contractors 41
4. Profitability of the fortune "250" and
36 and 13 DOD Contractors 4z
5. Rewards vs. Risks of DOD Contracting bi
6. Distribution of Government Sales by Segment 5^
7. Pooled Operating Margins (Intercompany) 6j




Since the early part of the nineteen sixties there have
been many discussions and numerous studies completed on the
profits attained Dy major government contractors. The press
is alive with many new discoveries of seemingly overpriced
items purchased "blindly" by the Defense Department. The view
of many is that the prime defense contractors are taxing
undue advantage of their positions, leaving the Department of
Defense and the taxpayers to carry tne burden of the
corporations* profitability.
The issue of profitability of those corporations that
supply the government with the goods and services to support
tne national defense is a crucial anu controversial one. itfitn
due regard to the risk factor, if the profits gained on
government business are higher than those gained in the
private sector, the government is wasting resources.
Conversely, if tne profits an. significantly lower in tne
government contracting business, tnen the major contractors
will seek otner markets, and the quality and availability oi
the necessary defense supplies will be adversely affected.
Despite the many profitability studies that have been
done, there seems to be little agreement on whether or not
the major defense contractoro are reaping greater, equal, or
lesser returns on business than the corporations engaged
solely in the private marketplace. In light of this
uncertainty, a further step into the profitability dimension
was taken that will clarify some of the confusion in this
area. The overall purpose of this study is to present
appropriate comparative data on DOD contractors and to
evaluate their profitability. Two important disclaimers arc
in order. First the research objectives and comparisons are
focused on presentation of objective, quantitative finanacial
data. There is no attempt to determine, on a qualitative
basis, the reasonableness or adequacy ot profits. Second,
this study has relied on published accounting data
througnout, particularly as they reflect the .allocation ol
costs, and no attempt is made to analyze the quality of
reported earnings, while data sources anc their limitations
are addressed in detail in Chapter II, tne study hinges on
the presumption that reported costs art properly allocated
and accurately classified. Allocation distortions with
respect to 00D contracting will tend to increase 000 contract
costs and reduce profits. In general, comparisons will be
less pronounced. A full discussion of the quality or earnings
is thus beyond tne scope of tnis thesis.
Tne study was structured to examine two principal
research questions. The first examines profitability from the
macro level, i.e., the aefense industry taken as u wnole. Tne
second question taKeS a closer look at several defense
contractors at tne micro level, i.e., individual firms ana
specific business segments within those firms. Botn questions
are addressed in trie same time frame to facilitate
comparisons and to serve as reference points for possible
replication or furtner study. Whether this period of study,
from 19ok tnrough 19b4, is representative of future trends,
valuable in illuminating previous ones or merely an anomaly
is only speculation and the proper focus of future research.
1. What is the relative profitability of firms doing
business with the government?
In the first question, a traditional approach is taken in
comparing profitability by identifying tne companies that
rely heavily on DOD contracts and comparing their returns to
some base level. Directly related to and a subset of tne
question of profitability is the question of the risks
involved in depending on government contracts for a
significant portion of profits.
2. how do profits of the defense-oriented segments (90
percent or greater of sales to DOD) within 13 prime
Department of Defense contractors compare to the
corporate segments principally involved in private
markets?
Tne secona question requires disentangling business
segments so that those segments principally engaged in
supplying jou may be compared with the other segmencs of tne
corporation which rely more extensively on the private
sector, in addition to considering the intracompany
comparisons, government/DOD segments are pooled and compared
with the private sectoc segments on an intercompany basis.
tiach of the research questions is addressed separately,
Question 1 in Chapter iV and Question 2 in Chapter V.
ltj
A. DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE OF THE iy8U's
The 1980*s provide an interesting, albeit unusual,
time frame to study defense contractors. The growth of
national defense spending under a pro-defense President might
suggest a favorable business environment for defense
contractors, however, the increases in defense spending must
be quantified and put in perspective, i.e. in terms of Gross
National Product (G^P), the national budget, and changes in
total DOD contract awards [Ref. 1: Sees. 5 ana 6J. Table 1
provides these summary data.
As a percent of GNP, national defense budget authoricy
has seen minor fluctuations but nas averaged 5.04 percent
during the period L'yb<j-lbu4 . by comparison, during the
previous 5 year period, trie average was 5.16 percent.
in 1980, national defense's snare of tocal budget
authoricy-1- was Z±.2 percent. In lloA, it had giown to 20
percent and is projected to increase to nearly 33 percent by
19b8. Outlays^ (in current dollars) for National defense have
increased 70 percent over tne 1900-19b4 period, compared to a
4S) percent increase in the 197S-19SIJ period.
trom the defense contractors' point of view, tne
principal interest is how much of trie increase in defense
Budget authoricy is appropriated each year by Congress
and represents funding that will be spent over a subsequent
year or period of years.
2
,budget outlays are the dollars tnat are actually spent
by an agency during tne fiscal year.
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spending is allocated to prime contracts for goods and
services. A review of DOD prime contract awards during tne
period reveals that allocation of the national defense budget
authority to prime contracts has remained nearly constant
(50-54 percent). As a percentage of outlays, prime contracts
nave ranged from 57-63 percent.
TABLE 1
DEFENSE SPENDING IN PERSPECTI VE : 1980-1984
(billions of current aollars)
Ftf-80 FY-Sl Frf-82 FY-83 FY-84
GNP 2575.8 2885.9 8046.*; 3221.4 3581.1
TOTAL 678.1 749.1 813.8 887.9 949.7
BUDGET
AUThUKii Y
DEFENSE 143.8 180.0 216.5 245.0 265.1
BUDGET
AUTHORITY
DEFENSE 133.9 157.5 185.3 2C9.9 227.4
OUTLAWS
PRIME DJD 76. a 97.4 116.7 128.2 133.6
CONTRACTS
Source: office of Management and Budget, Historical rubles:
Buoget of tut United States Government fiscal iecf l9oG . GPO,
^ash ing ton , DC" 1^85.
In terms of Gi>jP, share of notional budget, and dollar
value of prime contracts let by the DuD, the size of cne DJD
"pit.-" has increased dramatically in the 1980's. A clear
upward trend lias Deen established, and it is against this
backdrop that this study mast be viewed.
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B. THE DQD PIE
In studying trie profitability of corporations, tne
question of the present and projected future demand for the
products plays a significant part in tne overall evaluation.
With the Department of Defense prime contractors, a wary eye
has been cast toward the longevity of the customer and
supplier relationship. This can be seen in the financial
reports of DUD-oriented firms where a caution is included
concerning the possible termination of the long term
contracts at the convenience of the government, inese
statements are usually followed by affirmations about trie
protection provisions covering costs incurred as well <as tne
payment of any applicable fees or profits. Even with the
threat of possible termination -5
,
there are many companies
vying for a piece of the defense market "pie."
Within tne snort time frame of this scady, which
admittedly covers tiie defense buildup of tne eignties, the
obligation of prime contract dollars has risen from 5>76.o
billion in fiscal year 1 9 8 J to $133.6 billion in fiscal year
1S/L4 [Kef. jJ, an increase of 57 percent, figure 1 sticks the
increase of defense contracts in relation to tne increase of
the national budget authority.
From reports publisneo by tne u. b. Department of
Defense, Directorate for Information, Operations and Reports
(DlUK)
, terminations for Lhe ^asi_ Live years nave averaged .b







Total Defense Budget Authority
Total National Budget Authority
Figure 1. Defense Contracts and the National Budget
The source used for information concerning the annual
size and the recipients of the major portion of the
Department of Defense contracts is the DOD Directorate for
Information, Operations, and Reports (DIOR) publication
entitled 100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar- of Prime
Contract Awards (Top 100) which is further described in
Chapter II. The following are pertinent facts concerning tne
Top lidu summary data as they apply to this study. Selection
of companies for study is explained in Chapter III.
(1) Prior to 1983, the companies listed were for prime
contracts awarded in excess of $10,000. Since 1983 the
listing is for contracts which exceed $25,000.
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(2) The 100 companies listed each year have received
between 6b percent and 70 percent of the total volume
of awarded contracts.
(3) in the five years studied, fifty four corapanies
consistently appeared each year.
(4) The forty nine companies that were selected for study
from the fifty four received between 49 percent and 5<i
percent of the total contract awards.
(5) Over the period covered in this study, an average of
17 companies per year were added and subtracted from
the list of 100.
In summary, the "pie's" largest pieces are obligated in
single and multi-year contracts and are repeatedly won by a
select few. The remaining portions are sought and won by
companies which are not included in the "Top 100" on a
consistent basis.
C. PROBLEMS IN STUDYING PROFIT
1
. Def mi t ions
because the term "profit" may Le used and interpreted
differently by economists, accountants, corporate financial
officers, lenders, government contracting officers, and
federal agencies, its definition is of primary importance. In
this stuoy, profit is defined as the amount of gross revenues
that remain after deduction of all costs, expenses, interest,
and taxes. Therefore, "profit", "net profit", and "net
income" are considered synonymous. "Operating profit" is
defined as earnings before interest and taxes.
Profit is generally related to some other financial
measure (i.e. sales, shareholder's equity, total
lb
capitalization etc.) and expressed as a percentage . This
percentage, with profit as the numerator and another
financial measure as the denominator, provides the profit
"rate" or "return" on a specific base. The denominator or
"base" is critical in measuring profitability, for totally
different conclusions can be reached using the same numerator
over different denominators.
In this study, "net worth" and "sales" are used for
the bases in the profit equations (specific reasons for using
net worth follow in this section and for using Sales in
Chapter V). The definition of net worth is important, for
tnere are many financial information sources that differ in
the treatment of its components. For this study, "net worth"
includes all capital stock (less preferred stock tnat carries
mandatory redemption restrictions or is outside the company's
control), surplus, and retained earnings.
2
.
Selection of a Profit Measure
A number of protit measures have been used in
studying defense contractors. While no one measure nas gained
universal acceptance, net income divided tiy net wortn was
selected as the comparative measure because of tne following
reasons:
A. it precludes the distortion introduced when trying to
account for government-f urnisned plant, property, and
equipment
.
b. over time, significant changes to a corporation's
financial structure will ultimately be reflected in its
net wortn.
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C. to enable comparisons with the principal profit studies
completed in the past that have used this particular
measure as a profitability baseline.
D. because net worth is an important statement of the long





There exist several peculiarities in studying DuD und
its contractors which have a measurable effect on annual
data. To reduce these annual variations within specific
firms, most of the data in this study has been "aggregated"
or grouped together, individual firms' financial data nave
been added to those of other firms and a mean or average
obtained. This is useful in comparing corporate behavior
because the mean or average represents a group of firms
viewed as a single entity. Throughout the study, aggregated
data will be identified by the use of means and/or the actual
number of data elements included in a group. Unless
otherwise noted, all data refer to the specific period of
this study, 1^60-1904.
a. Timing.
A tunoamentdl problem in studying contractors is
the time dimension. DUD reports conform to the federal fiscal
year (e.g., October 1- tSeptemoer JO). This can create a
timing difference for a corporation that is awarded a major
contract in the first quarter of a fiscal year, files
calendar year-end reports to the SEC and ends its corporate
year on J>h June the following year. The resulting distortion
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in data is apparent on an annual basis. For example, in 1982,
DOD reported contract awards to a firm that exceeded the
firm's total sales as reported at year end. This can be
traced to two factors. First, the FY83 DOD contract awards
represented multi-year procurement and second, the firm's
financial reports recognized only the initial year's
revenues. However, by using aggregate data, such isolated
annual distortions have been minimized.
b. Non-DOD Government Contracts.
Annually, DOD discloses both the dollar value and
tne specific firms awarded prime contracts [Ret. JJ.
However, many of the contractors listed are awarded
additional government contracts that are not includeo in tne
DOD figures. This is apparent when specific business
segments are examined in Chapter V. All of the firms studied
are segmented by product, business line, or major customers
and report revenues and expenses on that basis. Generally,
DOD and non-DuD government contracts are lumped together in
financial reports and labelled "government work". However,
because the proportion of non-DoD government worK is
relatively insignificant, uoD worK remains valid as a proxy
for toLal government worK .
tor example, one of tne primary non-DOD government agencies
that awards contracts to a number of the firms studied is the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), in
terms of budget, NASA's total buaget autnority nas amounted
to approximately 3 percent of Duu's total eacft year.
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c. Miscellany.
Many defense contractors actively participate in
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. FMS sales were
included as government sales because DOD administers this
program of Allied procurement.
4
. Summat y
In summary, the stuuy of prof ic in tne puolic or
private sectors is inherently difficult because of
definitions, selection of an appropriate base, and the
variations in data reported by the financial information
services. UuD contractors' profitability is further
complicated by timing, treatment of non-DOD government
contracts, and the FMS program.
D. HISTORICAL SURVEY OF PROFIT STUDIES
The number of profit studies of DJD contractors completed
during the last 20 years is considerable (tne Profit '76
annotated bibliography includes 53 citations alone), altnough
the majority were completed between 156o - 1577. Many of the
studies concentrated on the 156U's and were clearly skewed by
chc demands of military operations in Vietnam. Most recenti>,
DOD has concluded an IB month study of defense contractors
that *vas released in August 1 (jMS [Ret. 4 J , tne first such
comprehensive study since Profit '76 [Ref. b]
.
Profit has not been a major topical subject for the last
lb years. i'iiere &re isolated stucies, a inociest number of
journal articles, and less than a dozen known tneses on tne
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subject. By far the most voluminous reporting on profits of
DUD contractors has been in the news media. Of all these
various sources, the most useful to this research effort have
been the formal studies undertaken by the HAND Corporation,
the Logistics Management Institute (LMI), Government
Accounting Office (GAO) , and the Department of Defense (DOD).
Because of the detailed methodologies, breadth of data, and
bibl iograpnies , the studies in this group are considered
"baseline" works. A second group of studies primarily
represent critical analyses of the baseline stuuies, often
"borrowing" the data ana methodology of the primary
researchers.
While the methodology of the baseline studies is of
continuing interest to future researchers, the major
conclusions of the studies are important for two reasons,
b'irst they provide the historical context in which co view
changes in DOD profit policy. Second, the conclusions lac*.
any general consensus. They either "prove" that DOD
contractors operate in an environment of low risKs and nigh
profits or hign risks and low profits. There's little in the
way of middle ground, rthile tnis polarization is exaggerated,
there is no single study whose conclusions are universially
accepted. The studies vary significantly in level of
objectivity, size of data base, and most important, the
profit measure itself. More often than not, the conclusions
become a product of the specific profit measures established
2U
at the outset of the study. Among the measures included in
these studies were profits as a percentage of sales, as a
percentage of shareholder 's equity, and as a percentage of
total capital invested. Various assessments of risK, uect
leverage, and capital turnover also distinguish the studies.
The following key events and studies are helpful in
understanding the evolution of DOD profit policy and the
relationship of a monopsonist DOD to its industrial base.
This survey is not all-inclusive but merely representative of
the ii.ain policy currents:
DATE EVCisi'i'/LJTUDf
1^34 Tne Vinson-Trammell Act was passed to limit
profits on the construction of naval ships and
aircraft. It required each contractor to
return all profits that exceeded It) percent of
the tocal contract price for snip contracts and
12 percent of the total contract price for
aircraft contracts. Passed in tne wajse or
post-war profit scandals, this statute
represented the fust attempt to "legislate"
prof i t.s.
1^L>1 The Kenegot iu t ion doard is establisned to
review war, i\lavy, and Maritime Commission
contractor profits and empowered to reduce
profits where they are "excessive". All
contracts of $100, 00b. or more contained a
21
"renegotiation clause" that could be invoked by
the Department secretary.
1962 McClellan Hearings investigate widespread
allegations of "profit pyramiding" of defense
contractors and their sub-contractors.
1964 "Weighted Guidelines" were introduced for
government contracting in answer to
.Congressional charges of "profit pyramiding"
and to prop up a sagging defense industry. Tne
weighted guidelines were a cost-based formula
that determined profit by a weighting scheme of
65 percent allocated to cost, 36 percent
allocated to risK, and 5 percent allocated to
other. The weighted guidelines set a precedent
for cost-based profits.
1967 A RAND study, Risk and tne Aerospace Rate of
Return [Ref . 5] , addressed tne question of
whether above average return on equity for
Aerospace contractors was linked to above
average risk exposure during the perioci
1957-1964. The study concluded that defense
contractors' return could not be explained on
the oasis of risk alone.
1967 Prot. Murray Aeidtnuaum publishes Arms ciuu tne
American Economy: A Domestic Convergence
Hypotnesis [rtef . 7 ] . The scudy concluded that
22
defense work profits (defined as a percentage
of net worth) exceeded profits on similar
commercial worK.
1969 Logistics Management Institute (LMI) Defense
Industry Profit Review was publisned in a
series in 1967,1969 and 1970 [Hef. 8].
1967: reported "downward" trend in defense
business profitability with
concurrent upward trend in commercial
profitability. Major indices
induced profit as a percent oL:
sales, equity investment, total
investment and costs.
1969: continuation of 1967 study. Using
profitability oase of Total Capital
Investment (TCI), concludes that
defense profitability as percent of
TCI is trending downward wnile the
commercial sector is crending upward,
and explained by, more competition,
inflation, anu fixed price contracts.
197Ij: based on 19btf-1968 data and supported
1967 and 1969 findings. The study
found tnat (1) defense business
showed low average profits »\/nen





profit inequities exist due to
differing capital requirements, and
(3) defense contractors are capable
of competing in commercial markets.
GAO Defense Industry Profit Study
,
[Kef. 9],
concluded that defense business profits were
significantly lower than commercial business
profits, using profits as a percentage of sales
as the measure, in a survey of 74 major DOD
contractors and a review of 146 DOD, MASA, and
Coast Guard negotiated contracts from
1964-1969. When profits were expressed as a
percentage of equity capital and total capital
investment, DOD contractors and commercial
contractors were similar.




adequacy of profits in relation to risk. Profit
is expressed as a percentage of: sales, equity
capital, and total capital investment.
It concluded on the ba^is ot perioc studied
(1956-1969) that profit rates by any measure
have fallen ana are currently belovv rates for
like commercial work, despite increased risk.
Department oL Defense (DUD) Profit '76
study revealed that defense business was
24
cnaracter ized by high risks and low
profits. It led to DPC 76-3, the new profit
policy for DQD in 1976, that revised the
Weighted Guidelines to increase facilities
investment and to increase potential profit by
inclusion of imputed cost of capital.
1985 DOD Defense Financial and Investment
Review continues the "Profit '76" methodology
using 1975-1983 data. It found that during tne
period 197U-1979 defense profits were
comparable to durable goods manufacturers.
However, average defense profits during
198U-1983 decreased slightly while profits of
durable goods manufacturers deteriorated
dramatically. The study concluded that defense
business remained profitable because of (1)
increased defense outlays and (2) decline in
inflation. Trie study found that the current
profit policy was basically sound and in need
of only minor refinements.
What has emerged from tnese primary studies is a wide
range of conclusions and little agreement on analytical
techni4ues or research approach. Authorship has
predictably led to charges oi bias and critical reaction by
interest groups. Thus, an historical survey of profit stuaie:
25
is useful in studying profit today only in terms of
sampling/selection techniques, statistical methods, and
selection of profit indices. In addition, studying the
analyses of the major studies is helpful in avoiding the
known pitfalls in this research field.
Profit '76
,
[Ref. b: pp C3-C4J included a list of salient
profit study points that are particularly useful in designing
and formulating any study of defense contractors. Those
guidelines have been modified to apply specifically to this
study and are shown below:
1. Objectivity of the premises and methodologies
a. what were the underlying assumptions?
b. were the assumptions justified?
c. Vvas a study approach taken that would
eliminate/minimize bias?
2. Representation of the Defense Industry in samples
a. how were the firms selected?
b. Are the firms representative of the defense
population?
3. Are statistical methods properly applied?
a. Is data aggregation misleading?
b. Is tne study period long enough to determine
accurate trends?
c. Are data qualified by statistical results, i.e.
standard deviation, means, confidence intervals?
4. Do commercial versus delense profits provide a
valid basis for comparison?
a. Are meaningful segment comparisons drawn?




Ideal source data are clear, concise, accurate,
standardized, readily available, and consistent, however such
data are difficult to obtain, considering the many different
accounting practices, reporting principles, ana the various
forms of DCD contracts. Tne purpose of this chapter is to
identify and explain the selection of Che aata sources.
In selecting sources for comparison of corporate
financial standing, the choices are fairly limited out of
excellent quality. All are publicly available and fall into
two basic categories: the primary sources (SEC form iLJK
reports and the Department of Defense Directorate for
Information, Operations and Reports lttl) Companies ) and the
secondary sources (Zioody's handbook, of Common Stocks , The
Value Line , and Fortune )
.
The primary sources were used for determining tne prime
concractors, { 1QQ Companies ) and for separating and examining
the corporations' business segments (SEC luK reports). The
secondary sources were used to obtain standard financial
information such as sales revenues, net income, operating
margins, and net worth. In the process of accumulating tne
corporate financial information for analysis ana comparison,
a significant data base,, included in the Appendices, was
developed. This data base, when used with the computer
statistical program, MlNlTAB, proviued tne means for
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analyzing and testing tne data acquired from the primary and
secondary sources. Tnough initially labor intensive, the
creation of a data base was well worth the effort, especially
for repetitive hypothesis testing and regression analysis. In
the remaining portion of this chapter, the use, impact and
limitations of each of the data sources will be reviewed.
A. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) lfciK REPORTS
The 1DK reports were used for segregating, within a
company, government business from private industry business
and were primarily composed of the corporations' annual
report and additional information required by tne Securities
and Exchange Commission. With only general financial
reporting guidelines provided by the financial Accounting
Standards Board (tASB), the contractors follow many different
accounting practices and report the data differently, i'his
inconsistency in reporting materially affects tne accuracy of
the aata and hampers direct comparisons.
Tnese differences came to light in attempting to extract
tne business segment information for tne development of a
statistical data base. Where some of the corporations clearly
present the extent of the government business Dy segments,
others only provide percent of government business for the
corporation as a whole.
In the original formulation of the goals ol tnis study,
it was hoped that the segments could be separated showing
sales, expenses ^nc profits all allotted to particular
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customers, either government or commercial. Such clear
separation was the exception rather than the rule. So the
original objective was modified by identifying the segments
with 90 percent or greater of sales attributed to the
government. This change accommodated the limitations imposed
by the differences in financial reporting.
B. FORTUNE
Fortune [Kef. il] was selected Decause of the annual
evaluation of the 500 largest corporations in the United
States, lian^ed by total sales, the corporations are also
ranked by other financial indicators such as growth rate or
total return to investors, tor the purposes of this btudy,
the E'or tune 500 was selected as a comparative base on which
to evaluate the performance of the prime Department or
Defense contractors. The comparative measure used in this




C. MOODY'S HANDBOOK Oir COMMON STOCKS AND THE \Z*LUL LlNci
Both Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks [Kef. ±2\ and
i'he Value Line [Kef. 1JJ provide extensive financial and
business information in a concise and standardized format.
Altnough differing in numbers of corporations covered
( I'loouy ' s reports on about 900 ana The Vcilue Line reports on
about 1700), actual formats, and some of the methods in
formulating ratios, they are both considered accurate anu
systematically current. Botti provide quarterly updates on the
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data and evaluations on all of the companies reported on,
witn the data compiled from individual corporate inputs.
Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks was selected as a
source for comparative corporate data because of the
similarity of computing net worth ana the operating profit
margin with tne methods used by Fortune in evaluating tne
5U(J. The difference is that moody ' s and Fortune exclude the
preferred stock when its redemption is mandatory or outside
the control of tiie company in their return on stockholders '
equity ratio. The Value Line does not.
D. lQl) COMPANIES RECEIVING The LARGEST DullAH VOLUME 01
FKi^lE CONTRACT AWARDS'
This report is published annually by tne Department of
Defense Directorate for Information, Operation and Reports
(DIOR) ana lists the prime contractors and dollar value of
contracts awarded. The report, known as the "Top lfc)fc>"
,
contains a number of tables which range from displaying tne
first five companies' percent of the total awards to showing
tne companies with contract awards in excess of $2 billion.
Since only DOD contract information on a government fiscal
year oasis is included, tne usefulness or the report was
limited to identifying tne corporations and determining the
size and dis tr lOut ion of annual contract awards.
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III. THE SAMPLES/ DEFINING THE aUSINESS POPULATION
A. SELECTION OF SAMPLES
The initial approach to selecting a statistically
meaningful yet manageable sample was to determine the
proportion of total corporate sales represented by DOD sales
for the firms listed in the DOD "Top 100" report for fiscal
years 1980-1984. Sales to DOD were aivided by total Sales for
each fiLm for each of the five years, then averaged. Jsing
trie average proportion of DOD sales for the five year period,
each firm was plotted, with the expectation of studying a
representative sample in the 4u-60 percent range, i'he results
were unexpected: only 4 firms fell into tne 40-60 percent
range. Expanding tne ran^e to j0-7l> percent added only 5
additional firms. The greatest concentration was discovered
in the 1-20 percent range, and only 2 firms averaged greater
than 70 percent for the period. With tnis added insight, the
initial approach was scrapped.
The second approach used to determine tne sample proved
successful. The 1960 - 19b4 "Top 100" reports were surveyed
to identify which companies had appeared in all five years.
Neitner the relative position of the company in the report
nor tiie proportion ot tne dollar amount of D0jj sales Lo cotal
sales were regarded as factors for selection. An acditional
requirement was tnat tne companies selected be publicly
traded in order to ensure availability of financial data.
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This alternative approach yielded 54 publicly traded
companies that had survived the period witn their corporate
and financial identities intact. All of the firms selected
could be tracked from year to year despite mergers and
acquisitions, five of the firms whose financial structure was
altered by changes that would question the validity of
year-to-year comparisons were eliminated after
additional research. The best example of this case was AT&T
that appeared in all 5 years but whose financial structure
after divestiture in 1983 would significantly bias the data.
The 49 companies (Table 2) represent a broad cross
section of corporations and include many of the principal
industry groupings. On an annual basis, the average
proportion of combined total sales of the 49 firms
represented by tneir combined DOD sales ranges from a high of
25 percent to a low of 18 percent. Combining ail five years
of data yields a 22 percent average. Total sales range from
a hign of $114,989 million (Exxon) to a low of $281 million
(Sanders Associates. Inc.) The single characteristic that
linKs these firms is that tney nave Deen among the "Top 10b"
prime D00 contractors for five consecutive years.
b
. UK I ENTAT I ON
There was a clear division among the 49 companies in
terms of proportion of 00D sales to total corporate sales.
The initial approach to sample selection was used to
subdivide the 49 firms into two additional comparative
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TABLE 2
SAMPLE OF 4 9 DOD PRIME CONTRACTORS
Allied Corporation Atlantic Richfield Co.
AVCO Corporation Boeing Company
Chevron Corporation Coastal Corporation
Control Data Corporation E-Systems, Inc.
Emerson Electric Co. EXXON Corporation
FMC Corporation Fairchild Industries, Inc.
Ford Motor Company General Dynamics Corporation
General Electric Company General Motors Corporation
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Gould, Inc.
Grumman Corporation harris Corporation
Hercules, Inc. Honeywell, Inc.
ITT Corporation International Business rtacnines
Litton Industries, inc. LocKheed Corporation
Martin marietta Corporation incDonnell Douglas Corporation
Mobil Corporation Morton Thiokol, Inc.
Motorola, Inc. Nortnrop Corporation
Penn Central Corporation RCA Corporation
Raytneon Company Reynolds (R.J.) incustries, inc
Rockwell international Corp. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
Sanders Associates, inc. The Signal Companies, inc.
Singer Company Sperry Corporation
TRW Inc. Teledyne, inc.
Tenneco, Inc Textron, Inc.
Toad Shipyards Corp. United Tecnnologies Corporation
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
samples: 36 commercially-or ientea firms and 13 DOD-or i entea
firms. "Orientation" was defined on the basis of DOD sales to
total saies. i'he resulting distribution of the 49 companies
on this proportion led to tne "3D percent rule". Various
stuaies nave used u similar approach with the segregation of
firms based on sales orientation ranging from 10-513 percent.
in this case, 3D percent was chosen because there was a clear
break at that level. Figure 2 shows the interval Dasea on tne
mean proportion of DOD sales for both groups and its standard
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deviation. It was the widest point of separation in the
sample and preserved a fairly homogeneous grouping based on a
single characteristic.
Selection of anotner decision rule may nave "balanced"
the sample (the median of the 49 was 14.3 percent) but would
nave introduced an unnecessary analytical complication as the
sample median lies tar below the sample mean. Selection on
the basis of DOD sales alone (instead of total government
sales) also added a measure of consistency to the comparative
base
.
1. The 36 (TABLE 3)
The largest sample within the 4y are the 36
corporations considered commercially oriented by virtue of
having less thc»n 3(J percent of their total business with DOD;
tne actual proportion was far less. For the five years, the
aggregate average was 12 percent wich the highest annual
average of L4 percent and the lowest annual average of 11
percent
.
2. The l_i (TAbLh 4)
The second and smaller sample within the 4'j consists
of DOD-oriented firms whose proportion of DOD business
constitutes greater than jb percent of their total business.
Taking the 13 in aggregate, the average proportion of
government wotk within the sample for five years was 41>.4
percent with the highest annual average of 56 percent and the
lowest average of 4U percent.
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3. The Fortune "250"
In order to address overall profitability of the 49
firms to their like-sized competitors, a comparative standard
was created, the Fortune "250". Since the Fortune 500
numerical ranking relies on sales volume without regard to
industry, customer, or financial structure, it was viewed as
an unbiased and appropriate standard. The Fortune 5uL)
provides a traditional base for comparison and the position
of the 49 companies in tne For tune 500 was used to cetermine
the proper base. The ran* of the 49 companies for each of the
five years was recorded and examined for the appropriate
cutoff point. The Fortune "250" was the result. Taken on an
annual basis, nearly 90 percent were ranked among the upper
half of the Fortune 5u0. Selected profitability data from




In summary, the method of selection is not inherently
biased and has yielded 3 useful samples. The 49 will be used
to compare overall profitability of major defense contractors
with similarly-sized firms and the 36 and 13 will be used to
compare profitability on the basis of DuD business volume.
Though the "J0 percent rule" may appear arbitrary, it was
based wholly on the data ciistr ibut ion and thus might prove



























































Sanders Associates , Inc
.
37
IV. PROFITABILITY UF DUD CONTRACTORS—THE MACRO VIEW
A. GENERAL
The ratio of net income to net worth and the rationale
for its selection as the measure of profitability was
previously addressed in Chapter I. The macro view of
profitability presented in this chapter uses this measure and
approaches the question in four specific ways. First,
returns for all sample groups are summarized in tabular form
and graphed for comparing relative profitability trends.
Next, the differences in the data are .tested to ascertain
significance using statistical hypothesis testing. Third, the
question of relationships between the proportion of DUD sales
to total sales and profitability is examined usiny regression
analysis. Fourth, the elements of risk are addressed, again
using statistical techniques to analyze volatility in
historical profits. Chapter V will utilize a similar
approach on a micro basis in taking a closer look at tilt
profitability of the 13 DUD-oriented contractors' specific
business segments and their related risKs.
6. The Profitability Dimension 1960-1984
As a starting point for this discussion, i'AbLE b has been
constructed. It includes profit averages for all the samples
on an annual Dasis for the period l9oU-i964. The standard
deviation, a widely used measure of variability within a data
set 1
, is indicated in parentheses.
TABLE 5











1570(,.07) .1545(,.08) .1638 (,.05)
13tt8 (,.08) .1411 (.,08) . 1324 (. . 06)
1372(..09) .1215(..08) . l80o (..11)
1397 (,.06) .1252 (.,05) .1703 (
.
, 05)
1646(,.08) .1471 (.,08) .2133 (,.05)
1474 .1378 .1721
245 180 65
To compare the overall profitability of prime JJD
contractors with like-sized "civilian" tirms 2 , the 49 and
tne sub-groups of 36 and 13 are compared to the Fortune "25u"
on the basis of annual profit rates i.e. the Ni/Nw measure.
The profitability data summarized in Table 5 leads directly
to tne conclusion that prime contractors have been more
profitable tnan tneir commercially-oriented, like-sizea
competitors in the 80's. in fact, tne 49 have consistently
outperformed the irorLupe "250". A specific qualification is
in order: these data show only that a sample of 49 firms
which are JJUD contractors and whose total proportion of DUjJ
See Carrol [Kef. 17J and ureer and Lido [Ref . 18]. Tnese
researchers use the standard deviation as a measure of
var iabi 1 i ty
.
2
Though tne For tune "250" includes nearly ^L percent of
the 49 companies and thus is not a statistically "pure"
compdrcicive base, the influence of the 49 is reduced by the
relative size of the comparative base.
3<J
sales to total sales range from less than one percent to as
high as eighty percent has been more profitable when compared
to a group of 250 like-sized firms. The significance of this
comparison can be easily overstated, and viewing selected
data of TABLE 5 in graphical form is perhaps more meaningful.
In Figure 3, it is apparent that the sample of 4y firms
has performed better than the Fortune "250" firms,
particularly in the last three years. However, a closer look
at the 4y is necessary to clarify tne internal effects of the
two other samples included therein.
In Figure 4, the 36, the 13, ana tne Fortune "25u" are
compared using the same measure and scale. Here the data
support a somewhat different and more precise conclusion.
Wrien plotted separately, there is a clear separation between
tne 13 DOD-or ient.ed firms and cue 36 commercially-oriented
firms that appear to follow tne For tune "25w" more closely.
This would suggest some correlation between profitability ana
volume or D<jD business. The strengtn of this correlation will
be discussed later.
While tne data in TAbLt) 5 and Figures 3 and 4 support the
conclusion of greater profitability accruing to those wno
taKe on sufficient work to qualify as prime contractors, it
is necessary to statistically measure the significance of the





















































































Hypotnesis testing involves application of a common
statistical technique to support conclusions acout a
population or sample of interest. In tnis case, tne testing
is aimed at tne equality of means and consists of specirying
a null hypotnesis (Hoj, a researcn hypotnesis (Ha), a test
statistic, and a level of confidence or risk criterion for
accepting or rejecting tne null hypotnesis. The null
hypothesis in this case is that tne profit rates from the
samples of 49, 36, and 13 were drawn from the same population
as tne Fortune "25a". The researcn nypotnesis is that tne
samples were not drawn from tne same population. A t-test of
Ho: u j_=u2 versus Ha: Uj^U2 results in a test statistic • A
95 percent confidence level was selected. The hypotnesis
testing was cone using the MINITA3 statisr.ica I. computer
program. Because tne samples were selected on different
criteria and Decause of the nearly equal standard deviations
as shown in Table 5, tne assumption of independence of
samples was sufficiently supported.
3
The MIWITAtJ "Twosamp l.e " command uses the following test
statistic for tne t-test ot Ho: ^
1 =u 2 versus Ha: u^Ut:
b~+bL
Here x^ 1S tne sample mean ot the first sample, x 2 is tne
sample mean of the second samp l.e, s, and s~, are tne sample
standard deviations, and n^ ana n 2 are the two sample sizes
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Statistically, the spread in profits presented in TABLcI 5
is not nearly so stark when all tnree samples are compared to
the "250". In the years 1980, 1981, and 1982, the null
hypotnesis of equal means was supported at the 9b percent
confidence level. In other words, the mean profits were so
close that there was no statistical significance to the
differences, accepting a 5 percent chance of error. In 1983,
the null nypothesis was rejected for all three samples and in
1984, it was rejected for tne 49 and 13.
Thus, on the basis of the hypothesis tests, prime DOD
contractors' profits were no different than tnose firms
represented in tne lor tune ."250" in 198^-1982. tor 1933 and
1984 , however, there is a marked difference. In 1983, there
was less than 1 percent probability that the samples came
from the same population. In 1984, the same result was
observed for the 49 and 13. The 3G hau profits very close to
the "250" and were considered equal.
On balance, the results of statistical testing lor the
equality of means are mixed. While there are no consistent
trends over the 5 year period, the profit spread between DuJ
prime contractors and like-sized firms nas become
statistically significant in the last two years. A likely
explanation for these statistical results is the delayed
effect of the defense buildup outlined in Chapter 1. Sales
and revenues will lag contract awards. Whether this signals
the; beginning of a trend is merely speculation.
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D. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The next issue is to examine the relationship between the
ratio of DOD business to total business and profitability to
determine whether any correlation exists. Regression analysis
is the statistical technique used to test the hypothesis of a
linear relationship between two variables.
First, each of the 49 firm's DOD sales were divided by
total sales on an individual firm basis to obtain trie ratio
of DOD business (PCTDOD). Using the MINITAB statistical
package with PCTDOD as the independent variable, the Nl/NW
profit measure was regressed. Among the statistical data
resulting from the cest are several Key elements: the
constant or ^-intercept value, the regression equation with
the standard error of the coefficient una trie R-squared
value. These data are given in TABLE 6.
TAbLE 6
SELECTED REGRESSION DATA, PCTDOD vs NI/NW
Sign/Value of Std. error of






briefly, these selected regression ciaca reveal Lht
strengtn of the relationship between the variables and the
"fit" of the regression line. The constant or JC-intercept
value indicates the theoretical profit rate with no
4b
80 .144 + / .0709
ul .131 + / . Sd> i
82 .107 + / .135
6j .114 + / . 102






government sales. This is the starting point for the linear
relationship between profits and PCTDOD.
The coefficient sign provides evidence of any direct
relationship between profitability and PCTDOD. The
coefficient value is the slope (i.e., the change in y or
profitability Divided by the change in x or PCTDOD) of the
regression line and is the predicted change in profitability
per unit of increase in PCTDOD. In 1980, for example, the
COEFF value of .U7Q9 means that a 10 percent increase in
PCTDOD results in a .709 percent increase in profitability.
The standard error of the coefficient permits a ^uick t-test
of the coef
1
icient . Dividing the coefficient by its standarc
error results in the t-ratio. The higner this ratio, the more
unliKely that the coefficient is a random variation from
zero. Generally t-ratios greater than 2 strongly support the
conclusion that the coefficient is not equal to zero. The K^
is the "coefficient of determination" and indicates the
strength of relu t ionsnip between the variables.
LooKing at the data, the constants (y-intercepts) are
reasonably consistent witn tne rot tune "2Su" mean profit
rates and reveal the expected profitability with no DOD
soles. While tins is a value derived statistically from a
sample population that all have government sales it is still
a useful measure. Tne sign of the COEFF is positive in all 5
years. This reveals that a direct relationship exists between
PCTDOD and profits. Speci f ical iy , as uJD sales increase, so
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does profitability. However, the sign of the COhiFF must be
related to its value or slope. For all five years, the slope
is remarkable because of its flatness, nearly horizontal.
Based on this fact alone, many would argue chat the
regression is meaningless. The t-ratio calculated by dividing
the coefficient by its standard error strongly supports the
hypothesis that the coefficient is not equal to zero in 1982
and 1 U8J only, in other years, its value is less than 2. The
rt^ data also support such a conclusion.
The value of R2 inuicates the strength of the linear
relationship between the independent and dependent variables.
Its value ranges from fc) or no predictive vaiue to 1 or
perfect predictability and indicates the percent of total
error "explained" Dy cue regression line equation. In
general, the higher the H 2 value, the oetter the fit of the
regression line. For example, in 1983, the k 2 of .163 means
that 18.3 percent of the total residual error (i.e.
deviations of actual values from those precicted by trie
regression equation) is explained by the regression line.
Stronger linear relationships imply better predictability and
higher K2 values.
For the question of the relevant r^nge, wide variations
between predicted and actual values are flagged as part of
the MIMITAB regression program. Examination of these results
reveals that most of the regression errors occurred at the
high and low values of PCTDOD, i.e., where iJCi'JOu exceeded 5u
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percent or was less than 9 percent. A further series of
regressions was run to determine if any specific range
reduced the total error of the regression and increased the
correlation (R 2 ) between the variables. Various ranges of
PCTDOD were selected 4 and regressed ana tne resulting Up-
values recorded. The results of these selected regressions
were inconclusive. The highest k 2 values were obtuineu in tne
3i6-7L percent range witn the highest R 2 value of .489 in
1983. Thus, while a relevant range has been established, the
R 2 value makes such a range statistically inconclusive.
in summary, the regression analysis indicates tnat a
direct relationship between PCTDOD and profitability exists.
However, the H-squared and the flat slope of the regression
line confirm only a weak relationship that many statisticians
would immediately reject. The hypothesis that profitability
increases witn volume of uuD business has been supported witn
limited and weak statistical evidence. Tne relationship is
strongest when the firms 1 PCTDOD falls in tire iti-lti percent
range. One must conclude that there is little or no apparent
relationship between tne proportion of Duu sales and
prof l tabi 1 i ty
.
4,Ganges of PCTDOD on the low end (i.e. fcJ.y-.3tJ) and tne
high end (i.e. .40-. 99) in addition to various middle
combinations (i.e. .3U-.60, .20-. 7U, etc.) were tested.
Because these ranges approximated a separate regression
series for the group of 36 ana 13, regressions for these
specific groups are not reported.
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E. RISKS VS RETURNS
Risk, like profit, has many definitions, most of which
depend on point of view. At the macro level, risk may be
broadly equated to uncertainty or volatility of profits over
time. A useful and revealing measure of risk is the standard
deviation of mean profit rates observed over time, Tne iuea
here is that greater variability or spread in data from tne
mean will be reflected in a larger standard deviation,
indicating greater risk. In economic terms, the marketplace
establishes tne risk-free rate (usually taKen to approximate
the current rate on government-issued Treasury notes [Ref. 6:
pp 26-44 and Uef. 19] ) , and greater risK. exposure woula
entail adding a risk premium to the risk-free rate to
compensate risk-averse lenders and investors. The purpose of
this section is to assess the generally higher returns of DUD
contractors in terms or tneir risK exposure.
For the purposes of comparison, selected profitability
data of TAbLE b is repeated in TABLE 7. ignoring :cn^ profit
rate itself, it is clear that tne variability in returns tor
the For tune "2^^" ana tne 49 is rougnly equivalent. The 36 is
similar. In contrast, the 13 DOD-oriented contractors have
the single highest variation c . 1 i ) and the four lowest (.u5
and . U6 )
.
Figure 5 is a two panel grapn based on TaBLE 7 that
compares profit rate (top panel) and risk as measured by the
standard deviation (bottom panel) tor eacn of the years
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TABLE 7
NI/NW DATA for the FORTUNE "250", 49,36, and 13
Year Fortune "250" 49 36 13
80 .1493 (.07) .1570 (.07) .1545 (..08) .1638 (.05)
81 .1395 (.07) .1388 (.08) .1411 (..08) .1324 (.06)
82 .1108 (.07) .1372(.09) .1215(..08) .1808 (.11)
83 .1039 (.07) .1397 (.06) .1252 (,.05) .1703 (.05)
84 .1326(.08) .1646 (.08) .1471 (,.08) .2133 (.06)
studied. What Figure 5 reveals is that the 13 DOu-or iented
contractors have attained higher profits and have been
exposed to lower risks, dowever, there are two contradictions
in tnis conclusion: in 1981, defense contractors' protit rate
was slightly less than that of the 250 (.1324 vs .1395), and
in 1982, the standard deviation of profits for tne 13
exceeded that of the 25u oy .03.
In summary, there appears to be n_o_ relationship between
profitability and risk during the period. Higher profits do
not entail greater risK.s. in a like manner, lower profits do
not carry lower risks. Some would argue that this type of
analysis is overly simplistic ana fails to capture risK
adequately. However, at the macro level and using aggregated
data, it snows that defense contractors composing the 13
enjoy a greater profitability and that those profits are
subject to generally less variation over time. While the
evidence supporting this conclusion is certainly not
overwhelmingly persuasive, extending this type of comparison




































































<' / /tx x 'vy/X















. y x s
YY
s f















J - I 4.
0.1 1




0.09 X X N\\\
s ^
0.08 Wx / 7'
^ X v
o 0*7
X X N 7 ./•" y/ / / ' /Y /' / /
YY,] /// Y/Yk \ \ Y/Y ///
n nn
-
Y Y -/At y' y'
(YY






























v \ X\ \ v




/ / / \ "x \ /// >> x \x \ \ f YY \\x- ///\\N Y/ /\\\0.03 / / s\ xN yAs\x" y / V X x_ 7 / .-•' k \\] / s /'7/' -•k\\-
' y /
s \ x / .-' r > \ \ 'YY y V V " 'Y Y -i v \ \ V/,
0.02 / y y X X %' ' / / .w" \ s ' / / . S. \ / 7 7y j . X x.y/\ \ N- / / Y x S X X \ ^ 7 s ,'' x \x "' Y 7
0.01 y/y






Yy'A\\Y / / . v
\




/ .•• / vnSi \\N
SO 3 1 32 93 3 4.
Figure 5. Rewards vs. Risks of DOD Contracting
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F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of Chapter IV was to address the question of
profitability of DOD contractors at the macro level using
four separate approaches:
(1) summarizing profitability for all sample groups for
coiapar ison.
(2) statistically testing differences in profitability to
determine significance.
(3) using regress-ion analysis to determine the
relationship between profitability and volume of DOD
bus iness
.
(4) examining the risk exposure of DOD contractors
revealed in the volatility of their profits over time.
Approach 1 was merely a data summary that supported the
general conclusion of greater profitability of DOD
contracting. This conclusion was refined by separating the 4b
into its component subgroups of 36 commercially-oriented and
13 OOD-orientec firms, tiere, the data show a significant
profit spread for the 13 during the last 3 years. So, on tne
oasis of actual data, DJD contracting for the ^rirne
contractors has been mo r
e
profitable than the commercial
ventures of like-sized firms.
In approach 2, the general conclusions drawn from
observing the data are tested using statistical methods. Here
the results are mixed and less conclusive than in the first
approach. Despite the apparent absolute spread, profit rates
were statistically equivalent for all groups from 193^-1962.
in 1983 and i9b4 , nowever, the higner profits of tne 49 ana
13 were statistically significant. So, while the uuD figures
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are consistently higher, conclusions must be tempered with
statistical evidence. Thus, on tne basis of hypotnesis
testing, conclusions are limited to annual comparisons only,
rather than long term trends.
The question of DUD profitability as a function of tne
volume of DUD business is the focus of approach 3. The 4y
firms* relationship of profits to volume of UuD business was
established using a regression equation derived from the
actual data. The results were largely inconclusive, a wear;
relationship exists between profitability and tne volume ol
DUO business even when regressing profit on various ranges of
DUD business volume. The slope of the regression line and the
H^ values support no strong conclusions that more t»uD
business will result in more or less profitability. Un
balance, the regression analysis revealed little or no
relationsnip between profitability and PCTDUD. To generalize
this conclusion, once a firm joins the ranxs of the vfop
li^u', there is little incentive to increase the proportion of
DjO business, provided it nas profitable commercial
alternatives, whether at 1 percent or 60 percent, there
appears to be no promise of greater profitability us the
sales mix favors DUD. Porter [Hef. 2D] includes a
growtn/share matrix deveiopeu by tne boston Consulting Uroup
(bCG) that reveals the impact of such a profitability-market,
relationship.
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Finally, the volatility of profits was used as a measure
of risk. In this context, the standard deviation of
historical profits was equated to risk and was analyzed to
determine if DOD contractors are exposed to more or less risK
than their like-sized counterparts engaged in commercial
enterprise. The results were, that for the time frame
studied, DOD contracting has been both more profitable and
less risky than commercial business.
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V. PROFITABILITY OF POP CONTRACTORS - THE MICRO VIEW
A. GENERAL
Chapter IV addressed the question of overall
profitability of DOD contractors at the macro level. This
Chapter follows a similar methodology in looking at the
corporate structure of eleven of the thirteen government
oriented contractors. Her*-- the study is aimed at Lhe micro
level, examining individual corporate business entities or
segments that contribute to the overall prof 1 tabi 1 i cy of the
firm. Thus, this Chapter tries to address the question of how
the operating profits of the segments involved principally in
government business compare to the other segments of Lhe 11
DUD oriented prime contractors identifieu in TAbLE o.
TABLE 8.












Note: Tli is table is identical to TABLE 4. except tor two
corporations not presented here, United Technologies Corp.
and Raytheon Company.
Viewing the question of profitability at the micro level
consists of four separate ste^s. hirst discussed is the
method oi. diseni_c:ny 1 ing the business segments into government
and commercial. Second, the selection of an appropriate
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profitability measure is made. Third, the segments of all the
contractors are pooled in liKe categories and then compared
to each other on an intercompany basis. Finally, an
intracompany comparison of the profitability ot the segments
is summarized and graphed.
B. THE SEGMENTS
A Segment is broadly defined as a aist inguishable part or
subset of a company on which revenue and cost data are
accumulated. Examples of segments might include major
customers, manufacturing divisions, functions, producing
departments
, operations, and product lines.
The original plan for this study was to separate the
segments of the prime DOb contracting corporations into
government oriented and nongovernment oriented on the basis
ot sales ana then to compare the individual Segment's
profitability. After reviewing the bLC form lfciK reports anc
the financial statements of the corporations selected tor
study, the separation of the segments as originally conceived
was considered infe-asxble in many cases, for example, some
corporations clearly separate their segments by sales into-
government and nongovernment business, ucners report sales co
the government as a percentage of segment sales, and still
otner corporations only present the portion of government
sales as a percentage of total company sales. It is important
Co note that toca
1
sales to the government are used in this
bG
context, not just DOD sales. Government sales represent the
lowest level of corporate financial reporting and attempts to
disentanyle DOD from total government sales on a segment
basis were unsuccessful. Additionally, net worth in each case
is reported for the corporation as a whole and is not
divided, nor is it divisible among the segments, herein lies
the problem previously addressed in Chapter I: how to
separate the segments? An additional problem was that after
they were separated, by what measure could the segments be
compared?
Several studies tias/n argued against tiie feasibility of
separating the segments for these reasons and others
pertaining to the externalities of government related
business 1 , i'wo examples of externalities are patents and the
costs of recruiting and training personnel. Both of these may
have resulted from a government contract and subsequently
used for nongovernment production and vice versa.
Some of these cautions remain valid tocay. however, two
qualifications support this portion of the study.
(l) oefora 1977, segment reporting was not required by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (fcASB), and the
information needed to dioentangle the corporate segments was
not readily available to researchers. Since 1977,
corporations nave reported segmenc financial data, tnougn the
requirements remain broad enough to permit great variation in
report ing tooay
.
See for example Poirer ana Sarber y. 2^4 [Kef. 21J cna
boni p. 722 [uef. 16]
.
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(2) By using operating margin defined in Chapter I
(operating profit divided by sales) as the measure of
profitability, the problems related to net worth and other
measures that pertain only to the corporation as a wnole are
avoided. The segment profitability measure will be further
discussed later in this Chapter.
In addressing the first problem of separating the
segments, it was found that, of the tnirteen prime
contractors having DOD business of 3U percent or greater in
total sales, eleven reported total government sales cleai ly
enough to identify the percentages attributable to each
segment. TABLE 8 lists those eleven contractors. The
segments were then graphed on their proportion of government
sales. Three distinct categories, government, commercial anc
neutral resulted from the bi-modal distribution of the
percentages of government related sales. Figure G shows the
distribution of the segments oy percentages. Segments
reporting 80 percent and above closely approximate
exclusively government oriented segments and were titled
"government". Those reporting 20 percent or less were
designated "commercial" and the balance of the segments,
tanging from 5U percent to 7b percent, "neutral". The
resulting numbers of seyments in each category amounted to 17
government, 20 commercial anG 4 neutral, totaling 41 seyments
studied, when a seyme'nt was acquired, foriaed, sold or
dissolved within the time frame of this study, the data were
evaluated only for the time period of the seyment's
existence. For example, in oi\e case, only tnree years' data
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Figure 6: Distribution of Government Sales by Segment
C. THE PROFITABILITY MEASURE
Considering the limitations in analyzing ana comparing
segments, the measure chosen for comparison of profitability
is operating margin (segment operating profit:, divided Dy
total segment sales), histor i cally , operating margin is
considered a ^rof
l
cabi 1 i cy measure that is relatec directly
to efficiency. It indicates the efficiency of operations and
the pricing strategy of the company or segment. Operating
margin is not accepted universally for use as the sole
measure in comparing corporate profitability, i/vhen usee
singularly as the comparative measure, operating margin can
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be misleading 2
. One might also argue that comparing tne two
distinct segments, government and commercial, assimilates an
interindustry comparison (the problem of externalities
previously mentioned) and invalidates operating margin as an
effective measure [Ref. 17: p.547J. Finally, operating margin
does not distinguisn between subcontracted products and those
due to tne results ot in-house effort (value addea). Some
would argue tnat this fact biases tne data by artificially
inflating botn Sales volume and operating profit.
However, four points strengthen tne analysis Dased on
tins measure. First, tne restrictions of tnis study confine
the comparisons to the eleven prime contractors that derive
significant portions of tneir profits from sales to the
government. Second, no attempt is made to project the
findings to the company as a whole or to judge the
profitability of the segments in comparison to any firms
outside tne study. Third, the comparisons are only valid when
viewed over time and with the segments of prime contractors.
Fourth, studies have shown that a significant level of
subcontracting is widespread through all industry, so tne
2
To demonstrate the weakness in using profit as a percent
of sales, fcox [Ref. 22: p.31l)9J uses the following
illustration: "If a contractor uses government owned
equipment in a government owned plant and receives frequent
progress payments, he may have a relatively small investment
in his defense operations. Thus on a $1 million contract for
wnich lie receives a profit of $100,000 and invests $200,000,




variability that would be caused by this factor is again
neutralized by restricting the comparisons to the eleven
defense contractors in this study.
Therefore, operating margin is considered a relevant
measure for this study and may be the only viable measure for
comparing segments. Using this measure, the next section will
compare segments within the field of government contractors,
i.e., intercompany, and the following section will compare
segments within a company, i.e., intracompuny
.
D. INTERCOMPANY COMPARISONS
This section concentrates on comparing the government
segments with the coiamercial segments on an intercompany
basis. To enable this comparison, all 41 segments were first
pooled by category and year. The totals were then averaged
emu the standard deviations were derived. The results of
these calculations are shown in TABLE 9 arid figure 7, with.
the standard deviations enclosed in parentheses, in Figure 7,
a third line, interposed as a frame of reference, represents
the averaged annual operating margins for all J. b.
manufacturing firms, accumulated by tne U . S. Department of
Commerce, bureau or the Census [Ref. 23: p. XXVIIIJ.
Immediately apparent from the graph are two points, first,
trie government segments have consistently outperformed the
commercial segments. Second following the risk discussion in
Chapter iv, tne spread of the data (indicated by the standard
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deviations) is significantly greater in the commercial
segments than in the government segments.
TABLE 9
POOLED OPERATING MARGINS - ANNUAL MEANS
YEAR COMMERCIAL GOVERNMENT MANUFACTURERS
1980 .082 (.056) .08b; (.042) .076
1981 .052 (.108) .094 (.042) .074
1982 .024 (.121) .082 (.024) .053
1988 .044 (.060) .090 (.026) .062
1984 .069 (.078) .088 (.032) .071
TOTAL N 96 S3
The apparent differences in operating margins can be
addressed in two ways: materially and statistically, i'ne
conclusions stemming from each approach arc considerably
different. First, on a material basis, the data show a
consistently superior performance by the government segments
when compared to the commercial segments. Second, when
statistically measured over the five year period using tne
standard nypothesis test (previously explained in Chapter IV)
of tiie null hypothesis that tnase sample means were drawn
from populations with identical population means, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the bb percent level, except
for one year, 1983. Piirased differently, the mean operating
margins were so close or tne variations so large tnat in all
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Figure 7. Pooled Operating Margins (Intercompany)
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In summary, there is an obvious material difference
between the two categories of segments, with the government
segments repeatedly outperforming the commercial segments,
riowever, from the standpoint of the hypothesis tests, the
operating margins of the government segments were no
different than the commercial segments, except for 1983. In
that year, there was less than 1 percent chance that tne two
operating margins came from the same population.
E. IMTRACOMPANY COMPARISONS
This aiscussion is centered on the
'
per formdnce of the
government, commercial, and neutral segments witnin each of
the eleven prime contractors. TAbLE 10 is a composite of the
means of operating margins for the three categories of
segments. Within each of the companies, the operating margins
for the segments were combined into the corresponding
categories and then averaged over the five year period. The
standard deviation, indicated in parentheses, is presented as
a measure ol variability, from the summarized data in TABLE
lu, it is evident that the government segments returned
higher operating profits on sales than tne commercial
segments. The relationships of the margins may be more
understandable by viewing them graphically.
Figure 8 shows that in seven of the eleven firms, the
government segments performed significantly better than
corporate commercial segments. The neutral segments'
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TABLE 10

















.030 (.036) .095 ,.025)
.t)78 (.079) .099 [.016)
.039 (.168) .059 [.033)
.036 (.037) .085 ,.012)
.095 (.051) .116 ,.026) .099 (.008)
.081 ,.027) .104 (.017)
.079 (.068) .076 ,.004)
.015 (.037) . L*6b .017)
.046 (.086) .139 1 .032) . 0w7 (.062)
.073 (.043) .079 .017) . L84 ( . 012)
.099 (.023) .095 ,.043)
2k; 17 d4
. 054 .088 .U75
96 83 2U
performance split evenly in comparison to the government
segments. The numbers in parentheses in tigure 8 show the
number of segments represented by each of the bars.
The dato are further broken down by year, segment cind
corporation in the Annex following this Chapter.
Additionally, included in the Annex arc the "betas" of the
eleven corporations for each of the five years covered in
this study, oeta is a "risk" measure that, as defined by Trie
Value Line
, is aetived from a regression analysis between
weekly percent changes in tne price of a stock and weekly
percent changes in the New Yolk StocK Excnan^e Composite
Index over a period of five years. The betas are not viable
measures for use in segment analysis, but they are included

































































































Figure 8. Segment Operating Margins (Intracompany
)
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compared to the overall market (beta = 1). The betas and
portions of the other corporate information included in the
Annex were obtained from The Value Line
.
E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this Chapter was to assess the profitability
of eleven prime contractors at the micro level. To do so
required disentangling corporate segments ano then comparing
their profitability. Two approaches were taken:
(1) an intercompany comparison. The first approach in
comparing the segments involved pooling the segments
by category and then averaging the totals over the
five years of study.
(2) an intracompany comparison. The second approach
involved looking witnin tne corporat ions and comparing
the operating margins of tne three identified
categories, government, commercial and neutral.
In general, the results of these comparisons show
conclusively that the government segm nts nave been more
profitable curing tne last five years than have the
commercial segments as measured by operating profit divider
by sales, tor tne intercompany comparison, tnere was a
significant material spread between tne operating margins of
tne jovernmenc and commercial segmencs. Lven though che
hypothesis testing did not verity this significant difference
in means statistically, the consiscency of the material
difference cannot be ignored.
The intracompany comparison provides firm by firm support
for the conclusion of greater profitability of government
67
segments. Here the segments within each firm were compared,
and, in seven of the eleven firms, government segments were
more profitable by an average of 4 percent. Furtner, this
greater profitability is accompanied uy a much smaller
standard deviation which equates to less variability or
volatility in the government segments' operations.
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BOEING COMPANY
1. The Boeing Company is the leading producer of commercial
jet aircraft. Producing the 737, 747, 757 and 767, Boeing
also manufactures missiles (Minuteman, ALCM) , helicopters
(CH-46, Cri-47), E-3 AWACS, E-4 command post, E-6 submarine
communicator, hydrofoil boats, ground transportation systems,
and works on the MX missile.
2. Sales to the government have averaged 34 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1984.
3. Corporate segments include: Commercial Transportation,
Military Transportation, and Missiles and Space.
SEGMENTS
OPERATING MARGINS
() - Signifies Negative Number
1980 1981 196 2 198 3 1984
Comm. Trans. .090
Mil. Trans. .0 84













BETA 1.25 1.20 1.25 1.20 1.15
OPERATING MARGIN FIVE YEAR MEANS PlK SEGMEN'i
(CCC - Commercial Segments, GGG - Government Segments)



























1. FMC Corp. is the world's largest producer of natural soda
ash and manufactures and sells other chemicals and machinery.
The machinery is sold for industrial, agricultural and
defense use.
2. Sales to tne government have averaged 32 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1984.
3. Corporate segments include: industrial Chemical, Petroleum
Equipment Services, Defense Equipment and Systems, Performance
Chemicals and Specialized Machinery.
OPERATING MARGINS
() - Signifies Negative Number
SEGMENTS 1980 1981 1982 lb3j 19o4
Indus
. Chem. .lib .148 .154 .158 .182
Pet. Equip. .173 .203 . 160 (.033) (.093)
Def
.
Lquip. .126 .092 .082 .09 9 .135





.017 (.005) (.057) (.k>26) .05j
BETA 1.05 1.00 .95 .95 .9b
OPERATING MARGIN 1IVE fEAR i-lEANS PER ScGMENT
(CCC" - Commercial Segments , GGG - Government Segments
)




























































1. General Dynamics is the largest U. S. defense contractor.
Products made include: military aircraft (F-16, F-lll parts),
Atlas and Centaur boosters, Tomahawk missiles, tactical
missiles, LNG tankers, naval vessels, submarines (S3N-668,
Trident), and data devices. Products sola are lime and coal.
2. Sales to the government have averaged 82 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1984.
3. Corporate segments include: Government Aerospace, Government
Snipbuilding
, Commercial Shipbuilding, Lane Systems and Other.
OPERATING MARG iNS
() - signifies negative Number
SEGMENTS x980 1981 1^82 lb>8J 1^34
Gov. Aerosp. .069 .082 .09b .100 . ±03
Gov. Shipb. .026 .010 .026 . 060 .094
Comm. Shipb. .004 (. J10) (. 380) (.006) .14 7
Land sys. .032 .032 .036
Other . 0S6 .015 . 008 .020 . 02 J
BcTA 1.3, 1.30 1.35 1.30 1 . 3^
OPERATING MARGIN ElVc YEAR MEANS PEH SEGMENT
(CCC - Commercial Segments, GGG - Government Segments)














1 GGG GGG (CCC)
1 GL.G GGG (CCC) GGG CCC
I
GGG GoG (CCC) GGG CCC
1 GGG GGG (CCC) GGG CCC
GOV. GUV. COMM. LA.NO OTiiLR
AERO. SniPb. ShlPa. SYS.
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GRUMMAN CORPORATION
1. Grumman Corp. is the largest producer of carrier-based
aircraft. Military aircraft include the F-14A, A-6E, EA-6B,
KA-6D, E-2C, X-29, and C-2A. Non-aerospace products include
truck bodies, canoes, yachts, and special purpose vehicles.
Otner activities include hydrofoil boats and data processing
2. Sales to tne government have averaged 90 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1984.
3. Corporate segments include: Aerospace, Information and
Financial Services, and Commercial Products, Non-Aerospace.
OPERATING MARGliMS
() - Signifies Negative number





















( . k>30 )
bti'i'rt 1.2b 1.30 1.10 1.10 1.0b
OPERATING MARGIN flVE ¥EAR MEANS PLR SEGMENT
(CCC - Commercial Segments, GGG - Governmtnt oe^rt.ents)































1. Litton Industries Inc. produces defense electronic
systems, material handling equipment, machine tools, computer
and ruicrowave components, integrated circuits, motors and
drives, avionic instruments, electronic and mechanical
components, medical equipment and warships.
2. Sales to the government have averaged 34 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1984.
3. Corporate segments include: Advanced Electronic Systems,
business Systems, Electronic and Electrical Products,




() - Signifies Negacive Number
SEGMENTS 1980 1981 196 2 196 3 19o^
Adv. E. Sys. .104 .084 .106 . 101 . 103
bus. Sys. .053 .042 (.001)
t.
. & E . Sys. .098 . 101 .09 j . o 6 ' .06 7
1 nd . S . & 6 . . 160 .17 .162 .kJ90 . 6 5
Mar . E. hi p . .161 . 1 1 j .093 .111 .104
bETA 1.40 1.45 1.45 1.4- 1 . 3u
OPERATING MARGIN FIVE Yt.AR McANS FER SEGMENT
(CCC - Commercial Segments, uGG - Government Segments)
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1. Lockheed Corp. is one of the largest J. S. defense
contractors. Aircraft production includes C-130/L-100 and C-b
transports, P-3 antisubmarine warfare and Tk-1 reconnaissance
aircraft. Rocket production includes Trident and Poseidon
missiles and Agena boosters. Other interests include
shipbuilding, electronics, and ocean mining.
2. Sales to the government have averaged b5 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1984.
3. Corporate segments include: Missiles, Space and




() - Signifies Negative Number
1980 19S1 1962 1903 984
M,S & E Sys. .0b9
Aero. Sys. .091













BETA l.bb .80 1.61 Lib 1.2b
OPERATING MARGIN I 1 v E YEAR MEANS Vtlti SeGiHEnT
(CCC - Commercial Segments, GGG - Government Segments)






































1. Martin Marietta Corp. is a major supplier of aerospace
launch systems, missile systems, command and control systems,
electronic and communication systems, information anc data
services, and aircraft components. Major systems include
Titan ill, Persning II, MX and Space Shuttle. Otner
activities include aggregates and refractories.
2. Sales to the government have averaged 48 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1984.
3. Corporate segments include: Aerospace Systems, basic
Products, and Data Systems.
OPERATING MARGINS
() - Signifies Negative Number


















BETA 1.05 1.15 1.25 1.25 1.25
OPERATING MARGIN HVE *EAR MEANS PER SEGMENT
(CCC - Commercial Segments , GGG - Government Segments
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1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. manufactures military aircraft
(F-15, F/A-ISa, AV-8B, C-9, KC-10); commercial aircraft
(MD-80, DC-10); spacecraft and missiles (harpoon, Delta,
Tomahawk, Payload Assist Module).
2. Sales to the government have averaged 69 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1984.
3. Corporate segments include: Combat Aircraft, Transport




() - Signifies Negative Number
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Comb. Air. .07^ .070 . 0oLi .080 .090
Trans. Air. .060 .030 . 040 .030 .026
Spac. S & .4is. .060 .065 .06b .070 .025
Info. Sys. .004 . 040 (.005) (.030) (.050)
BETA 1.20 1.20 1.15 1.15 1.10
OPERATING MARGIN FIVE YEAR MEANS tLt< SEGMENT
(CCC - Commercial Segments, GGG - Government Segments)

































1. Northrop Corporation produces t-5, F-20, F-18 and
structural components for the aoeing 747. Major research and
designs include the Advanced Tecnnology oomber, telephone and
broadcasting stations and sophisticated avionics for aircraft
and missiles.
2. Sales to the government have averaged 44 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1984.
3. Corporate segments include: Aircraft, Electronics,
Services, and Construction.
OPERATING (MARGINS
- Signif ies Negative number
SEGMENTS 1980 1981 1982 1983
Aircraft. .023 (.030) (.080) .040 . U8t>
Electronics. .110 .160 .100 .120 .115
Services. .183 . lyu .110 .149 .149
Construction. .170 .040 (.010) (.016)
SETA 1.40 1.30 1.30 1.15 1.10
OFEkaTIivG MARGIN FIVE *t,AK inE/S^S PbR SEGMENT
(CCC - Commercial Segments , GGG - Cover nment Segments
)
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ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
1. Rockwell International Corp. produces components for
trucks, automobiles, off-highway venicles, the Space Shuttle
and its main engines, navigation satellites, missiles, b-1
bomber, electronic systems, avionics, telecommunications
equipment, and microelectronic systems.
2. Sales to the government have averaged 37 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1964
.
3. Corporate segments include: Aerospace, Electronics,






1982 1983 196 4
Aerospace . .050 .089 .080 .090 .090
Electronics. .090 .062 .090 .089 .090
Automoti ve
.
. fc)50 .010 . 036 .036 . 120
Gen. Indus. . 100 .145 .096 .088 . 106
BETA .90 1.00 1.05 1.15 1.20
OPERATING MARGIN TlVt, *EAR fiEANS PER SEoi'lENT
(CCC - Commercial Segments, GGG - Government Segments)
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SANDERS ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED
1. Sanders Associates develops, manufactures, and sells
advanced technology electronic systems used in electronic
warfare, oceanograpny , electro-optics, antisubmarine devices,
long range communications, and precision products. In
addition Sanders makes digital plotters, digitizers, grapnic
displays and other computer-aided design equipment.
2. Sales to the government have averaged 56 percent of total
revenues for the period 1980-1984.
3. Corporate segments include: Government Systems and
Products and Graphic Systems and Products.
SOCMEN T\
OPERATING MARGINS
() - signifies Negative Number













BETA 1.55 1.50 1.30 1.25 1.20
OPERATING MARGIN FIVE *EAR rtEANS PbR SEGi^ENT
(CCC - Commercial Segments, GGG - Government Segments)


















VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The overall purpose of this study was to present
appropriate comparative data on major DOD contractors and to
evaluate their profitability. Two principal research
questions and specific objectives were developed to support
this purpose. Chapters I and LL outlined the study
methodology, provided the defense perspective of tne bob's
and framed tne historical context with a review of DJu profic
studies. Chapter HI discussed the comparative groups,
explained sampling techniques and defined tne business
population. Chapter IV addressed profitability from tne
overall or macro level, and Cnapter V addressed profitability
from a segment or micro level. The empirical findings and
the conclusions drawn from the tests and comparisons are
included with each of those Chapters. Rather tnan repeat
those assertions derived directly from the daca, this final
Chapter will briefly suramarize the findings and explore areas
for follow on research.
Oct cue bdsis of the profitability measures selected, the
period iy8k)-1984 proved to be very profitable for prime
contractors among the "Top ±ui)'. Those with sales to DJD tnac
comprised greater tnan JL) percent of total revenues have, as
a group, performed Detter than those with more modest
proportions of DOD business. This conclusion is supported
8U
both on a macro level and on a micro or segment basis which
includes non ODD government sales.
However, to generalize from this conclusion is considered
speculative. There are important qualifications on which this
study rests, not the least of which is a period of an
unprecedented peacetime defense buildup, because the total
DOD business required for a firm to achieve N Top 100' status
in 1984 has grown to nearly 141 million collars, the
conclusions do not necessarily apply to the nearly 20,000
otner prime defense contractors not induced in that group.
The volume of annual revenues sets the ^Top 100' apart in the
field of DUO contracting as well as in the positions they
hold in corporate America.
The variation of the uOD contractors' profits cy cither
measure used in this study has been consistently less tnan a
sample of like sized commercial firms. t,vtn on a segment
basis within individual firms, the variations in profits of
the government oriented segments proved to be much less than
those observed in segments with a commercial orientation. On
both an aggregate and segment Dasis, tnere was little
variability in profits and consequently less exposure to risk
for tlie major contractors studied. Thus tne traditional
relationship based on higher returns entailing greater risKS
is reversed. The "why" of the nigh profitability low ri^k
relationship nas not been addressed, however, risk and
related var iaDlts sucn as government furnished equipment,
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progress payments and backlogs may be an area of. interest to
future researchers.
The final research question asked in this study concerns
its usefulness and implications. First, like Gaul, there
exist three divergent views on DUD contractors: the uOD view,
that of the Congress as representatives of the public, and
that of corporate America, tohile tnese generalizations are
somewhat coarse and very broad, and acknowledging that there
are actually many more views, the ruore obvious contrasts
remain valid.
The current DUD view is summed up in the latest
prof i taoi 1 i ty study, Defense financial and investment Keview
(Dfc'Aik), [Ref. 4: p.IX-2], which states tnat "markup policies
are balanced, are protecting the interests of the taxpayer,
and are enaDling J.S. industry to achieve an equitable return
for their involvement in defense business". Basically, DUD
sees the contractors' environment as one of red cape,
continual oversight, endless regulation, and significant
risK. However, the contractors' profits, in the main, are
considered fair.
Conversely, tiie Congress and the public wane to De
assured that the defense cost/benefit ratio is in oalance.
The contractors are expected to provide trie DuD (and the
entire federal government) with goods and services at a
reasonable price. They appear to be less concerned with
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profits than with cost overruns, fraud, and the pricing
policies constantly reviewed in the press.
Corporate America's views are mixed. Tnough there are
strong incentives to jump on the DOD bandwagon, such a
strategic move has long term effects that might prove
detrimental in a more constrained economic environment. The
prime contractors among the *Top 1W0 ' seem to have adopted a
"hold" strategy that is fundamentally moderate. Some larger
commercial corporations are diversifying into defense while
others are merging to expand their shares of the DOD pie.
However, previous corporate excursions into commercial
enterprise by DOD hecivyweights nave often resulted in
failure. Notable in this category are General Dynamic's
Conv/airs 86b and 9bU and Lockheed's Electra and lfcll.
Thus, to significantly increase or decrease the proportion of
DOD business remains a strategic dilemma tor many
corporations: while the profit prospects of the l^db's are
inviting, the future is uncertain.
In an era of constrained resources, ooth numan ana
financial, and the rising costb of increasingly sopnis ticated
weapons systems, it is imperative to balance the need for a
strong defense industrial base witn trie fiscal realities of
the national buoget and the national debt. On this point,
there seems to be general agreement. In large part, DOD
contracting is the Key element in this balance.
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In summary, the profitability of DOD contractors should
be reviewed more frequently and policy refinements made on
the basis this empirical data. It is hoped that this study
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RTN 5002 . 1745.00 232.30 1303.5 1.
RJR 10354 . 202.00 67 0.40 3449.2 0.
ROK 6906 . 969.20 230.20 1740.2 1.
RO 47353 . 225.00 317 3.00 18621.0 0.
SAA Id 1 . 102. 2. 18 .50 130.5 1.
SGN 4235 . lo?.90 16 7.70 1312.6 J.
SMF 2737. 43 5.4C 3 3.10 427.4 0.
SY 5430 . 344.90 31 3.00 2033.7 0.
TRW 493 4 . i 08. Oo 21 1.90 1237. 1 0.
TDY 2926 . 396.20 34 3.30 1401.3 0.
TGT 13226. 1524.40 72 6.00 4164.0 0.
TXT 3377 . 5 7 8. 70 16 9.40 1153. 3 0.
TOD 610. 3 94.20 1 b .50 58.7 •
UTX 12324. 31 08. 9U 39 3.40 2753.0 1.
WX 3514. 932.00 40 2.90 2529.9 0.
8b
APPENDIX 6
1981 SELECTED CORPORATE FINANCIAL DATA
COMPANY TOTAL
NYSE SYM Sale s
ALD 6407.
ARC 2d2JS.
AV 222 6 .
BA 9733 .
CHV 45200 .
CGP 5 92 5 .
CDA 3101 .
6SY 572.
EMR 3 42 9 .
XON 114939 .
FMC 3367.


















MT I 957o .
MOT 333o.
NOC 199 1 .
PC 3 349.
RCA 3005 .


































































































































































3929 . 3 0.
1920 .7 I.
















1982 SELECTED CORPORATE FINANCIAL DATA
COMPANY TOTAL 00 D >i E T NET 0=CJMM
NYSE SYM SaLE s SALES INCOME WORTH i=govt
ALD 6167. 591.70 2 7 2.00 3207.0 0.
ARC 26991 . 2o8. 70 1676.10 9860.
3
w .
AV 2459. 667.90 32.01 1123.5 0.
BA 9035 . 323. 30 29 2.00 2313.0 1.
CHV 35943. 6 03.90 13 7 7.00 1324o.O
CGP 5817 . 132.50 6 5.60 523.6 0.
CDA 4292 . 175.30 15 5.10 1725. 0.
ESY 754 . 214. 70 3 5.80 90. > 0.
EMR 3 502 . 132.40 300.10 1550.
7
0.
XQN 10 3 553. 840. 5U 413 5.90 2 8440 • o 3.
FHC 3499. 13 70.60 15 2.40 1344.2 L.
FEN 110 4. 179.10 3 5.30 237. j 0.
F 3 706 7. 39 6. 70 -657.30 6077.5 0.
GO 6154. 58 91. 1C 160.50 1175.0 1.
GE 26500. 3654. 10 1317.00 1 0198 .0 0.
GM 60026 . 639.50 96 2.70 18287. 1 0.
GT 366 9 . 423.70 247. S3 2457.2 0.
GLO 1640 . 2 7 7.70 90.50 3 87.5 0.
GQ 2057. 1900.40 9 0.30 320.3 1.
HRS 1719. 263.90 75.60 596. 7 3.
HPC 2469 . 303.90 3 6 .90 1073.9 0.
HON 5490 . 1217.20 2 7 2.90 2143.4 3.
ITT 15 953
.
442.50 70 2.30 6122.6 ).
IBM 34364
•
1196.30 440 9.00 199o0.0 3.
LIT 4942 . 1316. 3u 315.00 16 76.3 1.
LK 5ol3 . 3498.50 237.30 413.4 1.
ML 3 52 6 . 2008.^0 9 1 .60 32i .5 1.
MO 7331 . 5630.10 214.70 1319.6 1 1.
MOB 63323 . 2 54. 10 133 0.00 14742 . 3.
MTI 15do . 2 51. oO b 3 . 40 3M3 . ? 0.
MOT ->7dt 237.30 lo 3.40 1700.0 0.
NQC 2470 . 15 53.20 5 . 40 493.9 1.
PC 3165 . 2 34. 0^> 156.10 1467.
7
0.
RCA 3237. 955.90 22 2.60 2442 .
5
•
RTN 5313. 2252.30 313.30 1711.7 1.
RJR 13075 . 2 86. lu 89 0.00 47o6. 3.
RQK 7395. 2690.50 33 1 .6) 2097.3 L.
RO 51615. 32c. 30 2uv 2 . 80 16197.0 3.
SAA <+.}6 . 3 03.50 2 6.40 174.8 1.
SGN 4936 . 307.20 113.20 lo94. 0.
SMF 2523. 54 9.10 -11 .50 435.5 0.
SY 507o . 1143. 90 113 .10 2364.4 \J #
TRW 5132. 86d. 7J 196.30 1519.4 0.
TOY 23o4 . 5 ^0.23 23 0.30 20 36.4 3.
TGT 14979 . 3 44. 60 340.00 5474.0 .
TXT 293o. 533.70 3 4.40 1227.3 3.
TOD 73 8 . 404.20 3 0.20 1 1 1 . 9 0.
UTX 13577. 4208.30 42 6.90 343t .7 1.
wx 9 74 5 . 1491. 70 44 9.30 3175. 3 0.
87
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2 3219. 3 •
1329. o 1.
32u.2 1.





























1984 SELECTED CORPORATE FINANCIAL DATA
COMPANY TOTAL
NYSE SYf 1 SaLE S

















































































































































































1 4 763. 0.




















2 6 48 9. D.
2010.9 L.
115L . ) 1.
626. 1.
234;> . 3 L.
1 3624.0 0.










1 7736. 1 r\
317.3 u
2693.0 0.











1980-1984 SEGMENT OPERATING MARGINS DATA
COMPANY SEGMENT 0=:COMM OPERATING MARGINS
NYSE SyM =govf 30 81 52 2 5 34
2 ==NEUT
3A ccri trans 'J .09 .04 .003 .0 14 . 003
MIL TRANS 1 .034 .132 .113 .110 . HI
MSL/SP ACE 1 .05 .053 .102 .09 .0 95
FMc INO LHEM VJ .13 5 . 143 .154 .168 . 132
PET EQUIP J .173 .203 .16 — .033 -. 093
OEF EuUlH i .126 .092 .0 82 .099 . 135
PERF CHEM .034 . 125 .030 .061 .105
SPfC MACH .017 -.005 -.057 -.026 . Ooi
GD GOV AEROSP 1 .069 .C32 .095 .100 . 103
GOV SHlPb L .025 .010 .0 26 .060 . 094
COM SH IP
6
.004 -.310 -.3 80 -.006 . 147
LA WO SYS 1 .032 .032 .0 33
OTHER .086 .015 .003 .020 . 023
GQ AEROSPACE L .0 80 . 104 .0 90 .0 30 .0 70
„ i/F SEKV .050 .012 .160 . 16J . 130
CCMM PRGO .0 26 - .0 50 -.080 -.02 -.0 30
LIT AOV E. SYS 2 . 104 .034 .106 .101 . 103
BUS SYS .053 .042 -.001
E L E SYS .098 . 101 .093 .0 36 . 037
INO S L S . 180 .170 .162 .090 .035
MAR £iP 1 . 161 . 113 .093 .111 . 104
LK Mt SCE SYS L .u59 .060 .060 .063 . 065
AERO SYS 2 .091 .10 8 .104 .138 . 099
M u I SYS 1 .125 .117 .089 .111 .053
ML AERO SYS 1 .073 .071 .0 76 .083 .073
BASIC PRO G .136 .104 -.050 .082 . 200
DATA SYS .051 .051 .057 .0 52
MO COMBAT AIR 1 .070 .070 .080 .030 . 090
TR AN S AIR .060 .030 .0 40 .030 .026
SPaCE SYS 1 .060 .065 .065 .3 70 .025
INFO SYS •J .004 .040 -.005 -.030 -. 050
MQC AIRCRAFT 2 .023 -.030 -.030 .040 . 030
ELECTRONICS 1 .110 . 160 .100 .120 . 116
SERyiCcS 1 .133 . 190 .1 10 .149 . 149
CONSTRUCTION .170 .040 -.0 10 -.016
rok AEROSPACE 1 .0 50 .039 .080- .090 .090
ELECTRONIC S 2 .0 90 .062 .090 .039 . 090
Ao rCMJTlVE J .u50 .010 .0 36 . Oo6 . 120
GEN INDUS . 100 . 145 .09o . J33 . 106
SAA GOVT S & P 1 .098 .03 7 .105 .091 .091
GRA S d P .103 . 135 .0 32 .0 75 .099
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